ISLAM, MUSLIMS & DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA
Zulkieflimansyah, Jakarta

Indonesia is the most populous Muslim nation in the world. Some 184 million classify themselves as Muslim. The historical evolution of the religion throughout the archipelago has, however, meant that the Muslim community in Indonesia is highly heterogeneous. This heterogeneity has only increased with development, modernization and globalization. It is therefore no surprise to hear a wide spectrum of voices representing Islam in Indonesia -- from the so-called radical, conservative positions to extreme liberal, secular proponents.

Furthermore, democratization has provided open space for these voices to get aired, and for there to be visual and verbal contestation between the differing perspectives. We see different political parties, Islamic institutions, civil society groups and associations claiming to speak for and on behalf of Islam. Sometimes the voices get loud and even abrasive and not all groups will find the views palatable, yet Indonesia's democratization process is on track when such contestations become the norm by which Indonesian Islam adapts to and operates within a democratic framework.

The emotional plea made by Aguswandi for promoters of "civil Islam" to take a strong stand against so-called "conservative Islam" (Say No to Conservative Islam, The Jakarta Post, Aug. 30, 2006) therefore comes as somewhat of a surprise. As a human rights advocate and presumably a strong proponent for a democratic Indonesia, the refusal to acknowledge the plurality of voices within Indonesian Islam is unfortunate.

The overwhelming simplification of what and who constituents "conservative Islam" and the rallying cry for a battle between "us" and "them" reflect a lack of understanding of the very democratic processes that Aguswandi wants to promote. It also reflects a certain naivete about political process which can at times cloak itself as an ideological struggle.

At the same time, Aguswandi displays a lack of in-depth understanding of sharia and casually flames the fear attached to the notion of "shariaization" that seems so popular these days. For example, he labels all who advocate sharia as the forces of "conservative Islam" which must be stopped.

This is because sharia "oppresses women, is antidemocratic and against multiculturalism." These forces of conservative Islam are also apparently non-indigenous to the extent that they have been "Arabized."

But such sweeping generalizations lead him to include not only those who advocate hudud laws but also more mainstream organizations and parties, such as NU, Muhammadiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), all of which have positions on the relevance of sharia in the daily lives of Muslims.

Sharia itself embraces a wide range of issues and varying positions, many of which are open to interpretation by the ulema. The kind of sharia that Aguswandi talks about focuses on hudud, the introduction of capital punishment, particularly in Aceh, such as stoning and severing of the hands for certain crimes.

But this is only one aspect of sharia. Aguswandi forgets the fact that there is flexibility written into sharia, which allows for Muslim jurists to reinterpret the law such that there are specific principles which are upheld, including principles of justice, equity, fairness, democracy and plurality.

Within the so-called conservative Islamic camp, many advocate for an understanding of sharia on a broader plane by which universal principles are upheld in the interpretation and implementation of Islamic law on a daily level. They argue for a deeper understanding of sharia and better education overall for Muslims to understand what living according to sharia is really like. This includes organizations like NU and Muhammadiyah, as well as political parties like PKS, the United Development Party (PPP) and Crescent Star Party (PBB).

By insisting that all who advocate sharia are in fact insisting on hudud and should be stopped, is tantamount to throwing the baby out with the bath water. It is undemocratic in its inability to accept that there are groups of people who want to live by religious laws, and who want to see religion have a public manifestation.

It is also ultimately self-defeating precisely because it removes any hope of dialog between various groups since a call for all Muslims to reject sharia and embrace secularism is unacceptable even to moderate Muslims.

Rather then call for a blanket battle against all who advocate sharia, Aguswandi should look carefully at the overall process as well as the institution of sharia in Indonesia. Survey results indicate that most Indonesians (and most Muslims in Southeast Asia) are unwilling to embrace hudud.

But, at the same time, they want to live within the framework of religious laws. The struggle/debate should be focused on the courts, the current process by which sharia laws are derived and implemented.

In all likelihood the institution of sharia in Indonesia remains weak and vague, in addition to the weakness inherent within the overall judicial system. The rallying cry should not be a blanket admonition of sharia.

Aguswandi is correct to voice concern over how sharia is being interpreted and implemented at the local level. He draws specifically from the Aceh example. But instead of blaming the forces of conservative Islam perhaps he should think carefully about how this process materialized and the real reasons why certain decisions were taken. Simple political factors were at play which had little ideological influence.

In many instances, the new decentralized structure has meant a need for local leaders to gain legitimacy. Many opted for a simple solution -- consider what the residents wanted and push for that. Introducing sharia seemed easier then providing concrete economic development.

Symbolically it had a greater effect. Were the advocates necessarily mullahs similar to the Taliban? Hardly, they were local leaders and administrators who had to make political decisions in the face of the new dynamics in Indonesia.

Aguswandi's piece is reflective of Islamaphobia and plays on the fears of people. Nevertheless he is entitled to his opinion, just as Muslim groups are entitled to their positions on where they would like to situate religion in their lives. The beauty of Indonesia today is that democratic space allows for these views to be heard.

In any democracy, some voices can appear louder then they seem, and some can come to dominate at times. The answer is to have democratic structures well-institutionalized and an effective state in place so that excesses can be checked.

Indonesia is unlikely to go down the path of Afghanistan under the Taliban, unless a substantial majority of the electorate is going to vote in a political party that will impose hudud laws throughout the land. Or alternatively, there may be absolute state failure vis-a-vis groups who are going to successfully impose hudud laws and declare an Islamic state. All indications thus far point the other way.

The writer is member of The House of Representatives from PKS. He can be reached at zzulkieflimansyah@yahoo.com   (The Jakarta Post,  September 12, 2006 )