IGH
cost economy is considered a real threat to the
inter-regional competition in economic development.
Businessmen are discouraged to start or run their
businesses due to the high cost. High cost economy is
indicated by illegal taxes, as well as legal taxes
which are in accordance with the rules of taxation but
requiring a relatively higher rate of tax, imposition
of double and multi-taxation, and long
bureaucracy.
Therefore, this research is proposed to identify the
important factors causing high cost economy in Aceh
and to describe how they work during both conflict and
post-conflict period.
Based on literature studies, economic cost of conflict
is potentially to create three effects. Firstly, there
will be external and internal displacement of people.
Secondly, the government will decrease the national
budget for public sector, but make the budget for
security sector become higher instead. Thirdly,
investment risk will also tend to be higher. Thus, it
will cause the increase of investment cost.
Fourthly, productions will no longer be effective.
These all are considered unlikely to promote
competitive investment and productions.
Lindgren observed that there is a loss of production
showing a difference between actual production
(percent of actual GDP in conflict) and counterfactual
production. Counterfactual production value is the
change of invesment value due to the increase of the
budget for military. Such increase might lessen the
potential investments to actually come to the region.
Surely, it will slow down the economic development.
(Lindgren; 2004).
Ra and Singh (2005) accounted for economic cost of
conflict and its effect on developmental expenses as
to lower in economic development in Nepal; by
classifying the periods into three, i.e. ‘no-conflict,
‘conflict’, and ‘high conflict’. Their research found
that in “conflict” period (2005-2009), if the
governmental expenses decline by 4,4%, GNP will
automatically decline by 8,3%. It interprets that the
average number of the decline of GNP is 1,7% per year.
During ‘high conflict’ period, if the governmental
expenses decline by two times lower than that in
“conflict period” (8,4%), GNP will decline by 10,3%.
They conclude- that the average decline of GNP is 2,1%
per year.
In addition, Knight (1996) said that war has
significant influence on slowing rate of investment.
According to Collier (1997), GNP per capita declined
by 2,2% per year compared with that of the GNP before
war. Staines (2004) concluded that during a conflict
in 1990, the number of real GNP was 1,7% under the
normal rate. But after the conflict, it turned to be
12,3% under the normal rate.
Deng (2004) explained that there is a number of
strategies for post-conflict economic recovery and
reconstruction process in Sudan. Those are
institutional infrastructure reconstruction, physical
infrastructure rehabilitation, human capital
reinvestment, social capital revitalization, and also,
improvement of economic development.
This research which was conducted in 2006, held a
number of interviews to 300 respondents coming from
three districts/cities in Aceh, i.e. Banda Aceh, Aceh
Utara, and Langsa. Those respondents are working as
businessmen, industrial investor, governmental
officers, and business organizations.
If we look backward,
there was an amazing increase of
Aceh GDP from 1982 to 1987 when PT.KKA (Paper
Kraft Aceh Industry) was working very productively.
This increase reached the number of 800.000.000, but
then it turned to be lower gradually , especially from
1989 to 1996, when Military Operation Zone (DOM) took
place. Afterwards, from 2000 to 2005, the number of
the increase changed to be much lower. But then, it
got higher in 1998 as PTPN (State Owned Tree Crop
Company) increased its activities in Aceh Timur.
Now let us see what was going on from 1968 to 2005.
Amazing! Foreign Direct Investment reached out their
glory from 1968 to 1980, when PT SAI (Cement) and PT
KKA (Kraft) performed their greatest productivities
(1968-1980). It was also well supported by the safe
condition in Aceh. But afterwards, their
productivities were trapped in an up-and-down
situation where the productivities went down from 1986
to 1989, and then turned to go up again in 1993 when
PT Humpus Aromatic was operating its activities. After
that, the productivities changed to be on the decrease
in 1994 Even, there was absolutely no productivity
1999 to 2005.
There are three influencing factors in the matter of
economic development, observed by this research, i.e.
(1) bureaucracy, including long and overlapping
procedures to get permits, permit costs, and illegal
taxes, (2) infrastructures, covering quantitative and
qualitative infrastructures for supporting business in
Aceh, and (3) stability of security.
Besides the above factors, this research also found a
number of factors causing the investment not growing
as smoothly in Aceh. One of the most affecting factors
is security, lending 50% of the cause. Then, 25% is
due to unfavorable bureaucracy and 20% by bad
infrastructures. The illegal taxes during both
military and civil emergency period are also one of
the important factors slowing down the economic
development in Aceh (71%). During the peace process,
illegal taxes turned to slow down (54%).
Apart from the above problems, there is another
problem in getting enterprise permit. In fact, the
cost for that matter is different with those
officially stamped. For example, the real cost of SITU
(premises permit) is only IDR 200.000, but in the
implementation, the cost to be paid is IRD 300.000.
Lastly, bureaucracy also plays bad
role in hampering invesment in Aceh. It can be
observed by the existing illegal taxes that should be
paid in process (81%), long procedure of permit
(70%), high legal cost (60%), and overlapping
procedure as well (57%). Strong infrastructures are
considered to be very important to stimulate investors
to develop their business in Aceh. But the research
meets with a lot of low quality of infrastructures
which are still existing in Aceh. (Translated by
Cut Famelia)